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JUSTICE, WAR, AND THE JAPANESE-
AMERICAN EVACUATION AND INTERNMENT
Book Review of-
JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
INTERNMENT CASES
By Peter Irons. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. Pp. xiii, 407.
$18.95.
Reviewed by Arval A. Morris*
With all the advantages of hindsight, the shameful episode that saw the
militarily ordered exclusion and internment of over 112,000 Japanese
Americans during World War II without declaration of martial law looms
as one of the greatest mass deprivations of civil liberties by the American
government since slavery. ' This harsh, vast, and discriminatory program
of uprooting and imprisoning concededly loyal Americans was initiated
by an Army general and avidly ordered and supervised by civilian heads
of the War Department, defended by the Justice Department, authorized
by President Roosevelt, endorsed by Congress, approved by the Supreme
Court, and, sadly, supported by the people. The additional sad fact is that
except for General DeWitt, every person important to producing this
shameful affair was a lawyer. Today, the wartime episode of the Japanese
Americans remains an evil blotch upon our national legal conscience and
our law, just as it was yesterday and surely will continue to be until the
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1. This shameful episode embodied "one of the most sweeping and complete deprivations of
constitutional rights in the history of this nation." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 235
(1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting). Thirty-six years later, Congress, by the Commission On Wartime
Relocation and Internment Act, Pub. L. No. 96-317, § 2, 94 Stat. 964 (1980), created a commission
composed of former members of Congress, the Supreme Court, the Cabinet, and distinguished pri-
vate citizens. The Commission held hearings in cities across the United States, reviewed documents
and made findings and conclusions that were unanimous. In general, the Commission found
that"[t]he broad historical causes which shaped these decisions [regarding exclusion and detention]
were race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure Df political leadership; that there was substantial
credible evidence, known at the time, from governmental agencies indicating that the claimed ground
of military necessity was defective and did not warrant the exclusion and detention of ethnic Japa-
nese," and that as a result, "[a] grave injustice was done to American citizens and resident aliens of
Japanese ancestry who, without individual review or any probative evidence against them, were ex-
cluded, removed and detained by the United States during World War II." PERSONAL JUSTICE DE-
NIED: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS 18 (1982)
(emphasis added).
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Japanese-American cases2 are repudiated, overruled, and completely
excised from our law.
The entire Japanese-American program of World War 1I violated and
degraded our nation's proper legal concerns for individual citizens, qua
individuals, and subverted the basic values that inform and sustain a de-
mocracy. It disparaged fundamental principles-that guilt is individual;
that citizens are to be treated with equal care and concern; that all Ameri-
cans have the constitutional right to move about freely, to live and work
where they choose, and to establish and maintain homes and families-all
of which are not to be impaired except on an individual basis, and only
2. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Yasui v. United States. 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). A fourth case and the last one decided at the end of
World War II Ex parte Endo. 323 U.S. 283 (1944), resulted in a hollow victory. Mitsuye Endo's
challenge was to the internment itself, and was based on habeas corpus. "We are of the view that
Mitsuye Endo should be given her liberty" wrote Justice Douglas for a unanimous court. Ex parte
Endo at 297, but, in "reaching that conclusion we do not come to the underlying constitutional is-
sues" because "we conclude that, whatever power the War Relocation Authority may have to detain
other classes of citizens, it has no authority to subject citizens who are concededly loyal to its leave
procedures." Id. "A citizen who is concededly loyal presents no problem of espionage or sabotage"
because "[hie who is loyal is by definition not a spy or a saboteur" and "detention which has no
relationship to [those] objective[s] is unauthorized." Id. at 302. Thus. Mitsuye Endo, a concededly
loyal American, obtained her freedom after more than two years of detention because her detention
was beyond the scope of all agency authority and not because her constitutional rights had been
violated: the War Relocation Authority's power "to detain a citizen or grant him a conditional release
as protection against espionage or sabotage is exhausted at least when his loyalty is conceded:" if the
Court held otherwise, it "would transform an espionage or sabotage measure into something else"
and "[tihat was not done by Executive Order No. 9066 or by the Act of March 21. 1942. which
ratified it." Id. at 302 (emphasis added).
The Court announced its Endo and Korematsu decisions on Monday, December 18. 1944. One day
earlier, in an unusual and amazingly timed press release by General Henry Pratt. then head of the
Western Defense Command, the War Department announced that "[tlhose persons of Japanese an-
cestry whose records have stood the test of Army scrutiny during the past two years," (i.e.. they
concededly were loyal) would be released from internment after January 2. 1945, and would be "per-
mitted the same freedom of movement throughout the United States as other loyal citizens and law-
abiding aliens." Thus, by revoking the mass exclusion orders issued in 1942, General Pratt
preempted the Supreme Court by one day, freeing Mitsuye Endo and many additional thousands of
Japanese Americans, after two years of unjustified incarceration.
Was the timing of General Pratt's announcement fortuitous? Peter Irons thinks not. basing his
remarks on an interview with Robert Daniels. an historian who relies on an unnamed source working
in the office of John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War at the time, and claims that "McCloy was
told by Frankfurter of the date the Supreme Court would issue the Endo opinion." Despite the hear-
say quality of their evidence, Irons reasonably concludes. "it seems clear that the War Department
was privy to the Court's timetable in the Korenatsu and Endo cases. " P.IRONS. JUSTICE AT WAR THE
STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES. 345 (1983) [hereinafter cited as IRONSI.
Endo's "victory" was hollow, and all Americans lost too.
For scathing condemnations of these decisions, see Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Mili-
tary Judgment, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 175 (1945): Rostow, The Japanese-Aierican Cases-A Disaster.
54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945); see also M. GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED 354 (1949). Peter Irons
states that in the years since the publication of the Dembitz and Rostow articles "not a single legal
scholar or writer has attempted a substantive defense of the Supreme Court opinions." IRONS, supra
at 371.
The Japanese-American Internment
after adequate notice, hearing, fair trial, and due process of law. The Jap-
anese-American program destroyed basic and precious constitutional
rights of equal participation in a democracy-the right to peaceably as-
semble; the rights of free speech and press; the rights freely to read, learn,
and hear; the right to vote, seek and hold public office; and the right and
responsibility to defend, with one's life if need be, one's beloved native
land. German Americans or Italian Americans were not subjected to this
kind of wartime treatment. Dangerously, it loosened judicial control of
the military. In summary, from a legal point of view, the shameful "Japa-
nese-American episode culminated in a constitutional sanctification, of
these deprivations by the highest court in the land-a court dedicated to
justice, defense of the Constitution, determination of the powers and limi-
tations of government, and protection of the rights of men." 3
In his highly recommended book, Justice at War,4 Peter Irons shows in
absorbing detail how it all happened. In the course of tracing the legal
histories of the four most important cases, 5 he also shows how the exclu-
sion and detention program tainted and tarnished almost everyone in-
volved-including a long list of certified liberal heroes. Moreover, he
presents disturbing evidence that the Supreme Court was factually misled
by the Justice Department.
On an inadequate factual basis, President Roosevelt and a Congress
dominated by New Deal Democrats gave carte blanche power to a bona
fide racist, Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, to subject Japanese
Americans to military control and detention without first declaring martial
law. Earl Warren, then Governor of California, firmly supported the pro-
gram. A distinguished group of New Deal liberals serving on the national
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) governing bodies-people like
Morris Ernst, Whitney North Seymour, Corliss Lamont, John Dos Pas-
sos, Elmer Rice, and Max Lerner-subordinated civil liberties to wartime
considerations and to a strong political loyalty to President Roosevelt. By
a two-to-one vote, the national ACLU supported the government's right
during wartime "to establish military zones and to remove persons, either
citizens or aliens, from such zones when their presence may endanger
national security, even in the absence of a declaration of martial law.' '6
3. J. TENBROEK, E. BARNHART & F. MATSON, PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 325-26
(1968). This altogether excellent book is required reading for any serious understanding of this pe-
riod.
4. IRONS, supra note 2. Peter Irons is a graduate of Harvard Law School and holds a Ph.D. from
Boston University. He is the author of THE NEw DEAL LAWYERS (1982), and is a professor of political
science at the University of California, San Diego.
5. See supra note 2.
6. IRONS, supra, note 2, at 129. (quoting from the Frank-Greene ACLU resolution). There was a
qualifying condition attached, but, nevertheless, the basic point remains. The qualifier stated that the
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To their credit, ACLU people at the local level, such as Mary Farqu-
harson and Art Barnett in Seattle and Ernest Besig in San Francisco,
strongly resisted and refused to withdraw, 7 thereby maintaining an ACLU
presence in the cases. Their position was that without a formal declaration
of martial law, the government could not authorize the military to remove
any citizen from his home. The national ACLU board disagreed. and
would only allow its lawyers to argue the narrower claim that the military
orders were invalid because they were applied in a racially discriminatory
manner. The national board ultimately prevailed over the local ACLU's
in the cases.
Edward Ennis, who was then in the Department of Justice's Alien
Enemy Control Unit and later served with distinction as general counsel
of the ACLU, repeatedly closeted his conscience and suppressed his best
judgment, carrying out the dictates of his superiors. The response of the
National Lawyers Guild was even more disappointing. It "actually
backed the wartime internment program." 8 "The Guild's wartime policy
was that of 'complete support' for Roosevelt and the American-Soviet
alliance ....- 9
Justice Hugo Black, with the approval of William 0. Douglas, wrote
the opinion for the Supreme Court in Koremnatsu,10 in which he denied
that the Japanese-American internment program was based in any part on
racial antagonism. He argued that it had been based on reasonable con-
gressional and military judgments, relying on General DeWitt's Final
national ACLU would support evacuation "only if directly necessary to the prosecution of the war or
defense of national security" and only if evacuation was "'based upon a classification having a rea-
sonable relationship to the danger intended to be met." presumably on the ground of some "'reason-
able basis." Id. at 129. Within a week, on June 22, 1942. the national ACLU board promptly moved
to implement its new policy instructing its Director. Roger Baldwin. to inform the ACLU's local
West Coast branches that "local committees are not free to sponsor cases in which the position is
taken that the government has no constitutional right to remove citizens from military areas" and to
"advise the defendants in the test cases already brought to arrange. if they desire, for counsel who
will be free to raise other constitutional issues." Id. at 130.
7. Mary Farquharson and Art Barnett acted as volunteers in the Hirabavashi case. Farquharson
wrote Baldwin from Seattle saying she was "shocked ...to learn of the action" of the national
ACLU Board. IRONS. supra note 2, at 131. Ernest Besig. Director. Northern California ACLU. re-
fused to back down, writing Baldwin from San Francisco that "we feel compelled to proceed as
before, because we cannot in good conscience withdraw from the [Korematsu] case at this late date."
He pointedly reminded the national ACLU director that "at the time of our intervention in this case
we were acting in complete accord with the Board's position." Id. On the other side of the local
ledger, Karl Bendetsen of Aberdeen, Washington, a very important figure in the evacuation program
as an advisor to General DeWitt, displayed a "single-minded and efficient dedication" to the "in-
ternuient campaign." Id. at 31; see also id. at 38 passim,. 58. 64 passim
8. Id. at 181.
9. Id. "Weighed against the wartime sacrifices of the Soviet people, the plight of the Japanese
Americans failed to evoke the Guild's sympathy for the test cases." Id.
10. Korematsu v. United States. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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Report on the evacuation stating that there were disloyal Japanese Ameri-
cans; that their identity could not reliably and quickly be determined; that
the West Coast was vulnerable to enemy attack, which disloyal Japanese
Americans surely would aid; and that, therefore, an emergency justified
the internment measures, which lasted more than two years.
Justices Black, Douglas, and others apparently ignored the racism
stated in General DeWitt's Final Report. He had branded all people of
Japanese ancestry as members of "an enemy race," and apparently the
Justices ignored General DeWitt's reasoning when, after admitting he had
no evidence of Japanese-American complicity in actions against the
United States, he incredibly concluded that "[tihe very fact that no sabo-
tage has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming indication that
such action will be taken"! 1 Justices Roberts, Murphy, and Jackson dis-
sented, with Justice Murphy declaring: "I dissent, therefore, from this
legalization of racism." 12 How did it all happen?
CREATING THE PROGRAM
In a surprise attack Japan bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.
Thereafter, no internal group appeared to be a more likely target for retri-
bution than the 117,000 Japanese-American citizens and Japanese aliens
who lived on the West Coast. The initial response, however, was surpris-
ingly sane; 13 but "some six weeks after Pearl Harbor . . . the tide of
public opinion abruptly shifted.' 1 4 On January 16, 1942, Congressman
Leland Ford, in identical letters to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, and
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director J. Edgar Hoover, urged
that "all Japanese, whether citizens or not, be placed in inland concentra-
tion camps."' 5 The manager of the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Associa-
tion, a powerful force in some congressional districts, replied to the
charge that they wanted "to get rid of the Japs for selfish reasons" by
saying that "[w]e might as well be honest. We do. It's a question of
whether the white man lives on the Pacific Coast or the brown man." ' 6
1I. IRONS, supra note 2. at 59, quoting DeWitt's Final Report, U.S. Dept. of War, Final Report,
Japanese Evacuation From the West Coast, 1942 33-34 (Wash. D.C., 1943).
12. Koremnatsu, 323 U.S. at 242 (Murphy. J. dissenting).
13. For example. from December 8, 1941, until January 30, 1942, the Los Angeles Times pub-
lished editorials urging that "there be no precipitation, no riots, no mob law"; that "thousands of
Japanese here and in other coast cities" were "'good Americans. born and educated as such": and
that the Japanese American Citizens League had promised its "fullest cooperation and its facilities"
to the government. The Times cautioned "Let's Not Get Rattled." IRONS, supra note 2. at 6.
14. IRONS, supra note 2.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 39-40.
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President Roosevelt's commission to investigate the attack on Pearl
Harbor, headed by Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, released its
report, which was headlined in the Sunday papers on January 25, 1942.
The Roberts Commission placed blame for lack of preparedness squarely
on the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii; but it also stated that Jap-
anese consular officials in Hawaii were part of an espionage ring that in-
cluded "persons having no open relations with the Japanese foreign ser-
vice," and that this ring had sent "information about U.S. military
installations to the Japanese Empire." 17 This flatly asserted imputation of
disloyal acts to Japanese Hawaiians has never been documented, but the
racial die was cast. It was all downhill after that. On January 28, 1942,
the Los Angeles Times editorialized that "the rigors of war demand
proper detention of Japanese and their immediate removal from the most
acute danger spots" on the West Coast. 18 Much earlier, on January 4, in a
private conference, General DeWitt, referring to Japanese Americans and
displaying his racism confessed "no confidence in their loyalty whatsoe-
ver"; he clarified his remarks saying, "I am speaking now of the native
born Japanese ... 42,000 in California alone."' 9 Thereafter, he became
adamant about excluding and relocating them. 20 It had become a "mili-
tary necessity."
Despite his basic humanitarian impulses, President Roosevelt's record
reflects "a limited awareness of and attention to the plight of racial mi-
norities." 21 Segregation was the law of the land. Politically, he depended
on Southerners who had racist values and dominated Congress, and he
himself was insensitive to the plight of Japanese Americans. In early Feb-
mary, 1942, on the urgings of General DeWitt, Secretary of War Henry
L. Stimson decided to put a question to Roosevelt: "Is the President will-
ing to authorize us to move Japanese citizens as well as aliens from re-
stricted areas?" 22 Without answering this question directly, Roosevelt
told Stimson "to go ahead on the line that [he] thought the best." Imme-
17. Id.
18. Id. at 7.
19. Id. at 37.
20. Indeed, General DeWitt sought to influence the drafting of the congressional statute that
ratified and implemented Roosevelt's Executive Order 9066 evacuating all persons of Japanese de-
scent from the West Coast: "'the recommendation of General DeWitt [was] that prison terms be man-
datory" for Japanese Americans found in any military zone where their presence had been prohibited
by military orders. Calling attention to the fact that "you have greater liberty to enforce a felony than
you have to enforce a misdemeanor," Karl Bendetson, General DeWitt's aid. "quoted DeWitt as
saying that 'you can shoot a man to enforce a felony.' " John J. McCloy "shrank from [DeWitt's]
trigger-happy proposal. and changed the statute that Bendetson had drafted to reduce the crime of
violating a military order to a misdemeanor ...." Id. at 65.
21. Id.at57.
22. Id.
Vol. 59:843, 1984
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diately thereafter, Stimson's assistant, John J. McCloy, telephoned Karl
Bendetsen at the Presidio in California, reporting that "we have carte
blanche to do what we want to as far as the President's concerned.' '23
Mass racial evacuation was on the move.
On February 19, 1942, seventy-four days after Pearl Harbor, President
Roosevelt, as President and as Commander-in-Chief, signed Executive
Order 9066. This order conferred authority on the War Department to
designate military zones "from which any or all persons may be ex-
cluded" and to place further restrictions on "the right of any person to
enter, remain in, or leave" such areas at the discretion of military authori-
ties. 24 Thus a racially based, military system of curfew, exclusion and
internment of concededly loyal Americans was authorized without any
declaration of martial law. The rights of more than 112,000 Japanese
Americans became subject to military edict when, on March 2, 1942,
General DeWitt declared the entire West Coast a "designated military
area." His aide, Karl Bendetsen, prepared the initial draft of a ratifying
statute for Congressional approval. Congress hurriedly ratified the presi-
dent's action when it passed Public Law 503-with only a ten minute
"debate" in the House and scarcely more in the Senate-incorporating
the standards of Executive Order 9066, criminalizing their violation and
also criminalizing violations of military orders, such as the curfew and
evacuation proclaimed thereunder. 25
HIRABAYASHI AND RACIAL CURFEW
A meager handful of cases were generated, and space permits only two
to be considered. 26 Gordon Hirabayashi, now in his mid-sixties and a
Professor of Sociology in Canada, was a student at the University of
Washington in March, 1942, living with a dozen other students in a dor-
mitory at the campus YMCA. He was and is a pacifist of principled com-
23. Id. at 58.
24. Id. at 63.
25. Id. at 66-67. Conservative Senator Robert Taft (Ohio) raised the sole objection in the Senate
saying,
I think this is probably the 'sloppiest' criminal law I have ever read or seen anywhere. It does not
say who shall prescribe the restrictions. It does not say how anyone shall know that the restric-
tions are applicable to that particular zone. It does not appear that there is any authority given to
anyone to prescribe any restriction .... I have no doubt that in peacetime no man could ever be
convicted under it, because the Court would find that it was so indefinite and so uncertain that it
could not be enforced under the Constitution.
Id. at 68. On March 18, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9102, which created the
War Relocation Authority as the civilian agency jointly responsible with the War Department for the
evacuation program.
26. I deal only with the Hirabayashi and Korematsu cases. For example, I do not deal with Yasui
v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
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mitment and deep religious conviction. 27 Like all Japanese Americans,
Hirabayashi was subject to General DeWitt's curfew order, requiring him
to be at home each night from 8 p.m. until 6 a.m. One night when it was
about five minutes of eight and he was running to his campus YMCA
room he stopped and said to himself: "Why the hell am I running back?
Am I an American or not? Why am I running back and nobody else is?" 28
He kept a diary of his activities, and he first broke curfew on May 4,
1942, when his friend, Helen Blom, had come to the YMCA to return his
raincoat, and "though it was 8 p.m.," he walked her home.2 9
Hirabayashi came to the firm conclusion that he would use himself to
test the constitutionality, not of General DeWitt's curfew order, but of
General DeWitt's more important orders excluding Japanese Americans
from the West Coast-an order under which Hirabayashi was subject to
evacuation on May 16--and the order interning them in detention camps.
Twenty-four years old, Hirabayashi arrived at the FBI office in Seattle on
May 16, 1942, accompanied by his lawyer, Arthur Barnett. Hirabayashi
told a surprised Special Agent Francis Manion that he must live by his
"Christian principles," that he felt it his "duty to maintain the demo-
cratic standards for which this nation lives," and that "[t]herefore, I must
refuse this order for evacuation," 30 thereby raising a most fundamental
constitutional question. Agent Manion confiscated Hirabayashi's brief-
case containing the diary in which he admitted to three curfew violations
between May 4 and May 10.
27. Gordon Hirabayashi grew up in an unconventional family. Born in 1918 . . . Hirabayashi
absorbed the pacifism of his parents. Japanese natives who belonged to a sect called "'Friends of the
World." Similar in organizational form and belief to the Quakers....
When he entered the University of Washington in Seattle in 1937. Hirabayashi became active
in the student religious and social-action groups . . . . He assumed a leadership role in the
student YMCA and the Japanese Student's Club. and also joined the Seattle chapter of the Japa-
nese American Citizens League....
As a YMCA officer, Hirabayashi traveled to New York City in the summer of 1940 to attend
the "President's School" held jointly at Columbia University and the affiliated Union Theologi-
cal Seminary. Here he was exposed in seminars and discussions to the social activism and paci-
fism preached by A.J. Muste. Evan Thomas (brother of Socialist Party leader Norman Thomas).
and John Nevin Sayre, all members of the pacifist Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR). This
experience proved to be a turning point in the young student's life. "I guess I was ready for that
philosophy." Hirabayashi later said. "It all made sense, and the fact that my parents belonged
to this non-conformist, non-church Christian group from Japan made these things at home to
me." Hirabayashi joined the FOR, which advocated nonviolent but militant resistance to war
and military service, during his summer in New York. On his return to Seattle. he registered
with his local draft board as a conscientious objector and was granted that status without objec-
tion.
IRONS, supra note 2, at 89-90.
28. Id. at90.
29. Id. at91.
30. Id. at 88.
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Gordon Hirabayashi was convicted on two counts-of intentionally vi-
olating both General DeWitt's evacuation order and his curfew order. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not decide his case but
certified questions of law about each conviction to the Supreme Court of
the United States, making possible a definitive, early decision on the con-
stitutional foundations of the Japanese-American evacuation and intern-
ment program. 31 In an opinion on June 21, 1943, by Chief Justice Stone,
the Supreme Court ducked the hard issues of evacuation and internment.
It upheld Hirabayashi's conviction for violating curfew but refused to re-
view the more profound question of his conviction for refusing to submit
to evacuation, on the weak ground that Hirabayashi's "sentences on the
two counts are to run concurrently and conviction on the second [curfew]
is sufficient to sustain the sentence." 32 Thus, the Court put off the more
difficult evacuation-internment issue, and it took an additional year be-
fore returning in Korematsu's case.
The most fundamental issue decided by the Court in Hirabayashi was
whether General DeWitt's curfew order could be selectively applied on a
racial basis solely to all Japanese Americans and Japanese aliens whether
loyal or not. Hirabayashi admitted that a military curfew applying gener-
ally to all persons in a "designated military zone" was an obvious device
protecting against sabotage, most readily committed during the hours of
darkness. But General DeWitt's curfew was selective, applying only to
persons of Japanese descent. As such, it was both over- and under-inclu-
sive because thousands upon thousands of Japanese Americans were
concededly loyal Americans and needlessly subjected to the curfew,
while disloyal persons not of Japanese descent were not subject to the
curfew at all. Thus, General DeWitt's curfew order was squarely
grounded on race. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld it.
Five years earlier in the famous Footnote Four to the Carolene Prod-
ucts case,33 Justice Stone stated that there
may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitution-
ality when legislation appears ... directed at ... racial minorities: whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 34
Ignoring this doctrine requiring heightened judicial scrutiny of racial
31. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83-85 (1943).
32. Id.at 105.
33. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
34. Id. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted).
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classifications, Chief Justice Stone ruled in Hiraba'vashi that governmen-
tal action need only have a minimal rational basis. 35
Irons' research into Supreme Court archives and draft opinions reveals
that "Stone swallowed whole the 'racial characteristics' arguments made
in the briefs submitted by the Justice Department and the three West
Coast states and repeated by Solicitor General Fahy in his oral argument
before the Supreme Court.' '36 Citing undocumented allegations that Japa-
nese Americans posed a fifth-column danger, their location in designated
military areas, their supposed adherence to Shintoism (Hirabayashi had
become a Quaker), and the system of dual citizenship maintained by the
law of Japan, Stone concluded that "the nature and extent of the racial
attachments of our Japanese inhabitants to the Japanese enemy were con-
sequently matters of grave concern" to General DeWitt. 37 Stone recog-
nized that hostile governmental action based on race is odious, but "mea-
sures necessary for the successful prosecution of the war" could override
constitutional concerns "and justify military orders 'which place citizens
of one ancestry in a different category from others.' "38 The Court re-
ferred four times to "facts and circumstances" that General DeWitt pos-
sibly may have relied upon to " 'show that one racial group more than
another' constituted 'a greater source of danger' to the Army's wartime
efforts. "39
Irons observes that Stone wrote his Hirabavashi opinion without
knowledge of the Office of Naval Intelligence's Ringle Report (known to
General DeWitt), which estimated the highest number of Japanese Amer-
icans "who would act as sabateurs or agents" of Japan as "less than three
percent of the total, or about 3500 in the entire United States." More-
over, according to the report, "the most dangerous [were] already in cus-
todial detention" or were "well known to the Naval Intelligence service
or the F.B.I." Ringle summarized: "In short, the entire 'Japanese Prob-
lem' has been magnified out of its true proportion, largely because of the
physical characteristics of the people [and] should be handled on the basis
of the individual, regardless of citizenship, and not on a racial basis."
Ringle proposed immediate individualized hearings for residents of
internment camps for deciding whether grounds existed to retain the
35. "Our investigation here does not go beyond the inquiry whether, in the light of all the rele-
vant circumstances preceding and attending their promulgation, the challenged orders and statute
afforded a reasonable basis for the action taken in imposing the curlew " Hirabayashl v United
States. 320 U.S. 81. 101 (1943).
36. IRONS. supra note 2. at 235.
37. Id. at 235-36.
38. Id. at 236.
39. Id.. "Gordon Hirabayashi became the only defendant torced back into prison by the Su-
preme Court." IRONS. ipra note 2, at 250-51.
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individual as "potentially dangerous." 40 Thus, as General DeWitt knew
but the Court did not, the Navy believed that 90% of the Army's evacua-
tion of Japanese Americans was unnecessary and that a maximum of
about 10,000 persons necessary for evacuation could readily be identified,
most by name.
Edward Ennis discovered the Ringle Report and made it known to Soli-
citor General Fahy a few days before the government filed its brief in the
Hirabayashi case, saying that "one of the crucial points" in Hirabayashi
forced the government to argue "that individual selective evacuation
would have been impractical and insufficient," but now "we have posi-
tive knowledge that the only Intelligence agency responsible for advising
General DeWitt gave him advice directly to the contrary.' '41 Ennis ad-
vised Fahy that the Justice Department had "a duty to advise the Court of
the existence of the Ringle memorandum ... [and] that any other course
of conduct might approximate the suppression of evidence.' '42 But the
government's brief did not bring the Ringle Report to any court's atten-
tion. Instead, it argued that the rationale behind General DeWitt's orders
was "not the loyalty or disloyalty of individuals but the danger from the
residence of the class as such within a vital military area" and that "the
identities of the potentially disloyal were not readily discoverable" and
"virtually impossible" to determine on the basis of individualized hear-
ings. 43
In addition to the Ringle Report, Stone "did [not] know that General
DeWitt's own intelligence staff had disclaimed any involvement by Japa-
nese Americans in espionage or sabotage in the period after Pearl Har-
bor"44 because responsible authorities failed to bring that information to
the Court's attention. Because the Court practically abdicated review of
military and Congressional action in Hirabayashi-'"it is not for any
court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or substitute its judg-
ment for theirs'" 45-Irons laconically observes: "Whether knowledge of
this material would have affected the outcome of the case is a matter of
speculation.' '46 Korematsu's case was left. Perhaps the Court would treat
40. Quotations from the Ringle Report come from IRONS. supra note 2, at 203.
41. Id. at 204.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 205.
44. Id. at 249.
45. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943).
46. IRONS, supra note 2, at 249. The Los Angeles Times hailed Hirabavashias "heartening news
for the Pacific Slope, where opinion has held with similar unanimity that the presence of any Japs
here is dangerous in wartime" and that "[a]gitation for the return of Japs to the Pacific Coast-which
has gained recruits in high circles in Washington-gets its devastating answer from the clear analysis
of the situation by Justice Stone . I... d. at 251-52. Representative J. Leroy Johnson of California
proposed to Congress a postwar deportation of all Japanese aliens and "disloyal" citizens as "a way
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the government's power to exclude an American from his home differ-
ently from the government's power to keep him in it.
KOREMATSU AND RACIAL EVACUATION
Three weeks after his evacuation deadline, confident he would not be
recognized as a Japanese American, Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu, a 23-
year-old welder from Oakland, was picked up on May 30, 1943, by the
San Leandro police as he was walking down the street with his Caucasian
fianc6e, Ida Boitano. Being in love, they had decided that Korematsu
should have "plastic surgery on his eyes and nose" during March 1942,
and that thereafter, "it might be possible for them to go to Arizona and
get married without anyone suspecting [he] was Japanese." Otherwise,
"he feared violence should anyone discover that he, a Japanese, was mar-
ried to an American girl. "47 Korematsu told the police that he was of
"Spanish-Hawaiian" origin, born in Las Vegas, and that his parents and
family had been killed in a fire that burned their house to the ground. His
story quickly fell apart when he was confronted with the facts that he
spoke no Spanish and that his draft card had been clumsily altered with an
ink eradicator. Thereafter, Korematsu confessed all. As the Supreme
Court described it, "[n]o question was raised as to [Korematsu's] loyalty
to the United States." 48 He "was convicted . ..for remaining in San
Leandro, California, a 'Military Area,' contrary to Civilian Exclusion Or-
der No. 34 of the Commanding General [DeWitt] of the Western Com-
mand, U.S. Army, which directed that after May 9, 1942, all persons of
Japanese ancestry should be excluded from that area. "49 Thus, racially
based exclusion and internment finally came before the Court.
Upholding Korematsu's conviction in December 1944, Justice Black's
Opinion for the Court recognized that the "Hirabayashi conviction and
this one thus rest on the ... same basic executive and military orders, all
of which orders were aimed at the twin dangers of espionage and sabo-
tage." 50 The Court further recognized that exclusion from one's home
"is a far greater deprivation" than being confined to it under a curfew
to get rid of a group that may make future trouble." Governor Earl Warren said that "nothing more
destructive to our defense could happen than to release the potential fifth columnists" and that the
return of Japanese Americans to the West Coast would result in sabotage and "a second Pearl Harbor
in California. " Id. at 250-51.
47. IRONS. supra note 2, at 95. The FBI report made at the time of his arrest describes Korematsu
as a member of the "yellow race," observing: "Scars or marks-Cut scar on the forehead, lump
between eyebrows on nose." Id. at 94.
48. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,216 (1944).
49. Idat 215-16.
50. Id. at 217.
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order. 51 Nevertheless, Korematsu's case was controlled by Hirabayashi.
In light of the decision in Hirabayashi, Black wrote, "we are unable to
conclude that it was beyond the war power of Congress and the Executive
to exclude thbse of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast area at the
time they did" 52 because, judged under Hirabayashi's minimal ration-
ality test, "exclusion from a threatened area, no less than curfew, has a
definite and close relationship to the prevention of espionage and sabo-
tage" 53 and "because we could not reject the finding of the military au-
thorities that it was impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of
the disloyal from the loyal." 5 4
Refusing to go behind General DeWitt's decision and evaluate its rea-
sonableness, the Court strained to separate the inseparable in order to
duck the issue whether concededly loyal Americans, like Korematsu,
could be interned, which was the inevitable next step after evacuation for
almost every Japanese American. The Court restricted its Korematsu
holding strictly to the question of evacuation, ruling that because Kore-
matsu had "not been convicted of failing to report or to remain in an
assembly or relocation center, we cannot in this case determine the valid-
ity of those separate provisions of [DeWitt's] order.' 5
Like Stone in Hirabayashi, Justice Black wrote his Korematsu opinion
without knowledge of the Ringle Report, which Edward Ennis had de-
nounced as "suppression of evidence,''56 and without knowledge that
General DeWitt's own intelligence staff had disclaimed any involvement
by Japanese Americans in espionage or sabotage in the period after Pearl
Harbor. A more disturbing concern was the shameful way in which Gen-
eral DeWitt's Final Report on the evacuation was suppressed in Hirabay-
ashi but ultimately brought to the attention of the Supreme Court in Kore-
matsu. There were two versions of this report, and Irons charges that in
"one significant respect, the differences between the two versions re-
sulted in misleading the Supreme Court in all three of the criminal test
cases that challenged General DeWitt's military orders.' '57
General DeWitt's Final Report was ten months in preparation by a
team headed by Colonel Karl Bendetsen, a lawyer from Aberdeen, Wash-
ington. Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, a lawyer, received
two printed and bound copies of it on its publication date of April 19,
51. Id. at218.
52. Id. at 217-18.
53. Id. at 218.
54. Id. at 219.
55. Id. at 222.
56. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
57. IRONS, supra note 2, at 207. The cases are Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and Yasui v. United
States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
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1943, well before briefs were due in the Supreme Court in the Hirabav-
ashi case, and a covering letter from Bendetsen saying that he understood
"there is an urgent need of the material contained therein for use in the
preparation of the Federal Government's briefs in the cases now pending
before the Supreme Court of the United States challenging the constitu-
tionality of the entire program.' 58
McCloy's hasty review of the report caused him concern for two rea-
sons, both damaging to the government's case. First, in the Foreward,
General DeWitt flatly stated his opposition to the return of Japanese
Americans to the West Coast at any time during the war irrespective of
their loyalty. 59 Second, in the important chapter entitled the "Need for
Military Control and for Evacuation," General DeWitt asserted, contrary
to the Navy's Ringle Report, that it had been "impossible to establish the
identity of the loyal and the disloyal with any degree of safety." But, his
next sentence claimed: "It was not that there was insufficient time in
which to make such a determination; it was simply a matter of facing the
realities that a positive determination could not be made, that an exact
separation of the 'sheep from the goats' was unfeasible. ' 60 Thus, Gen-
eral DeWitt appears to have been clearly motivated by racial considera-
tions, that is, he believed Japanese Americans were such a "tightly-knit
racial group" that separation of the disloyal from the loyal simply could
not have been accomplished by any means. Yet earlier, in his January 27,
1943 memo to the War Department, General DeWitt flatly stated that
"there was time to determine loyalty" once the evacuation group had
been collected together into assembly centers. Equally damaging was
General DeWitt's admission that lack of time to conduct individualized
loyalty hearings had not been a factor in his decision ordering evacua-
tion. 61 Thus, the "military necessity" argument of the government be-
came vulnerable to the counter-argument that the Japanese Americans
had been deprived of individualized hearings and due process of law.
McCloy telephoned Bendetsen, who told McCloy that only ten copies
of the Final Report had been printed, published, and transmitted. Under
pressure from McCloy and Bendetsen, General DeWitt accepted
McCloy's revision of the offending two sentences, now to read: "To
complicate the situaton no ready means existed for determining the loyal
58. IRONS. supra note 2, at 207, quoting Ernest Besig, director of the Northern California
ACLU.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 208.
61. Id.
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and the disloyal with any degree of safety. It was necessary to face the
realities-a positive determination could not have been made.' '62
McCloy's editing eliminated General DeWitt's admission that lack of
time to conduct loyalty hearings had not been a factor in General
DeWitt's evacuation decision. He disingenuously had substituted for
General DeWitt's racism claim (that in any event it was impossible to
determine loyalty) the explanation that the Army had no "ready means"
by which to perform the task. The other copies of General DeWitt's pub-
lished Final Report were tracked down and removed from War Depart-
ment files. "McCloy then instructed General DeWitt to submit a second
transmittal letter along with a revised and reprinted version of the Final
Report, as if the first had never existed.' '63 Knowing DeWitt was in the
process of preparing his report, the Justice Department earlier filed a
pending request with the War Department for all "published material" on
the evacuation. The Justice Department wanted to use General DeWitt's
report to prepare its brief in Hirabayashi. Although available, McCloy
took no chances and failed to provide either version of the report to the
Justice Department. "Protected by a 'Confidential' security label, the Fi-
nal Report was not in fact released by the War Department until January
1944, more than seven months after the Supreme Court decided" Hira-
bayashi,64 but in time for the Court's consideration of Korematsu.
Ennis was outraged when General DeWitt's Final Report was made
public because, inter alia, the War Department had deliberately withheld
it during preparation of the Hirabayashi brief. Moreover, he discovered
that there were two versions of the report and that his pending request for
"published materials" had not been honored. To avoid possible embar-
rassment with the Supreme Court, "Ennis asked Attorney General Biddle
late in January 1944 to put the FBI to work on a dissection of the DeWitt
report." 65 General DeWitt's report claimed that "substantially every ship
leaving a West Coast port was attacked by an enemy submarine in the
weeks after Pearl Harbor," but J. Edgar Hoover reported that
there is no information in the possession of this Bureau ... which would
indicate that the attacks made on ships or shores in the area immediately
after Pearl Harbor have been associated with any espionage activity ashore
or that there has been any illicit shore-to-ship signaling, either by radio or
lights. 66
The last item was important to Ennis because General DeWitt's Final
62. Id. at 210.
63. Id. at 211.
64. Id. at 212.
65. Id. at 280.
66. Id. at 280-81.
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Report cited "the interception of illicit radio transmissions" as military
justification for his evacuation order, and also charged the Justice Depart-
ment had "impeded" his search for clandestine transmitters. Ennis wrote
to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) chairman, asking for
information.
George Sterling, head of the FCC's Radio Intelligence Division, earlier
had submitted a memorandum dated January 9, 1942, a month before
General DeWitt formally recommended mass evacuation, and recounted
a meeting he had with General DeWitt. "Gen'l. DeWitt . . .seemed to
believe that the woods were full of Japs with transmitters," so "I pro-
ceeded to tell him and his staff" about FCC radio-monitoring opera-
tions.67 Referring to General DeWitt's operation, Sterling said,
"Frankly, I have never seen an organization that was so hopeless to cope
with radio intelligence requirements." 68
After his meeting with Sterling, General DeWitt requested that the War
Department establish "a joint Radio Intelligence Center for the purpose
of coordinating radio interecept . . . information now being collected by
the Army, Navy and FCC." This was done, and the FCC operated six-
teen monitoring stations on the West Coast capable of pinpointing "the
exact house and room in which a transmitter was located if necessary."
Moreover, early in 1942, at General DeWitt's request, the FCC set up
fully equipped roving coastal patrols, and by July 1, 1942, they had in-
vestigated 760 reports of suspicious radio signals-641 turned out not to
be radio signals at all and the remaining 119 were traced to Army and
Navy transmitters. "No cases involved signals which could not be identi-
fied." Sterling was emphatic, "there wasn't a single illicit station and
General DeWitt knew it." On April 4, 1944, the FCC chairman, James
L. Fly, after reviewing all his sources of information wrote to Attorney
General Biddle, summarizing that "[t]here were no radio signals reported
to the Commission which could not be identified, or which were unlaw-
ful"; moreover, "the Commission knows of no evidence of any illicit
radio signaling in this area during the period in question. "69
The FBI and FCC bombs went off in a memo about the Korematsu
67. Id. at 283.
68. Id.
The personnel is unskilled and untrained. Most are privates who can read only ten words a
minute. They know nothing about signal identification, wave propagation and other technical
subjects, so essential to radio intelligence procedure. They take bearings with loop equipment on
Japanese stations in Tokio . ..and report to their commanding officers that they have fixes on
Jap agents operating transmitters on the West Coast. These officers, knowing no different, pass
it on to the General and he takes their word for it. It's pathetic to say the least.
Id.
69. Id. at 284.
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brief from John Burling to Solicitor General Fahy. "The unmistakable
inference of the Final Report, Burling wrote, was that among the most
important factors making evacuation necessary were reports of frequent
signaling by unlawful radio transmitters from Japanese Americans on
shore to submarines at sea." ' 70 But the FBI had concluded that "no one
was ever seen signaling from a house or elsewhere to Japanese ships off
shore," and the FCC had found that "there was no unlawful radio signal-
ing going on." Thus, Burling concluded,
we are now ... in possession of substantially incontrovertible evidence that
the most important statements of fact advanced by General DeWitt to justify
the evacuation and detention were incorrect, and furthermore that General
DeWitt had cause to know, and in all probablility did know, that they were
incorrect at the time he embodied them in his final report to General Mar-
shall. 71
Burling, believing the Department had an ethical obligation to the
Court to refrain from citing and relying on the Final Report, sent the final
draft of the Justice Department's Korematsu brief to the printer contain-
ing a footnote clearly designed to alert the Supreme Court to the Depart-
ment's disavowal and repudiation of much of General DeWitt's Final Re-
port.72 But the printing presses were stopped when John J. McCloy of the
War Department discovered the footnote and asked Solicitor General
Fahy to remove it. Burling and Ennis balked. Assistant Attorney General
Herbert Wechsler, a Columbia Law Professor and a supervisor of the Ko-
rematsu brief, played the role of negotiator and drafted a new, compro-
mise footnote acceptable to the War Department and to Solicitor General
Fahy. It eliminated any reference to the espionage allegations in General
DeWitt's report: "We have specifically recited in this brief the facts relat-
ing to the justification for the evacuation, of which we ask the Court to
take judicial notice; and we rely upon the Final Report only to the extent
it relates to such facts. "'73 Thereafter it would take a very clever and
discriminating reading between the lines to discern any substantive
70. Id. at 285.
71. Id.
72. The footnote read:
The Final Report of General DeWitt is relied on in this brief for statistics and other details
concerning the actual evacuation and the events that took place subsequent thereto. The recital
of the circumstances justifying the evacuation as a matter of military necessity, however, is in
several respects, particularly with reference to the use of illegal radio transmitters and to shore-
to-ship signaling by persons of Japanese ancestry, in conflict with information in the possession
of the Department of Justice. In view of the contrariety of the reports on this matter we do not
ask the Court to take judicial notice of the recital of those facts contained in the Report.
Id. at 286.
73. Id.at290-91.
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criticisms of General DeWitt's Final Report. On October 5. 1944. the
Korenatsu brief was delivered to the Supreme Court, and misleading
semantic ambiguity triumphed over outright repudiation of General
DeWitt's Final Report.74
The Court in Korernatsu based its opinion on General DeWitt's un-
founded "finding" that Japanese Americans posed a danger of espionage
on the West Coast. The Court never went behind General DeWitt's "find-
ing" to evaluate its underlying facts independently. Perhaps Burling's
footnote would have moved the Court to do so, but perhaps not. Given
the Supreme Court's obvious willingness to uphold the Japanese-Ameri-
can evacuation, would its decision in Korematsu have been any different
if Burling's disputed footnote had been included? 75
Except for the roles played by a few lawyers, the World War 1I intern-
ment of Japanese Americans does not bring glory to the legal profession.
Some forty lawyers took part, over a period of three years, in the legal
battles that preceded and followed Roosevelt's signing of Executive Or-
der 9066, and twenty judges ruled on the cases that challenged the intern-
ment orders. The outcome of the cases reflected the failure of the legal
system that should have stood as a bulwark resisting racism, war hysteria.
and the failure of leadership at high levels of government. Instead, it was
lawyers and judges who produced what Justice Jackson aptly labeled in
his Korernatsu dissent, "a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any au-
thority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need." Al-
though Korematsu may currently be honored in the breach, its fundamen-
tal claim of "pressing public necessity"--short of a declaration of
martial law-was upheld by the Court in 1944. It is capable of revival and
74. Although the Court ducked the issue, the Justice Department's brief also addressed the ques-
tion of detention, seeking to defend it. The brief relied almost completely on General DeWitt's Final
Report's "'preventive detention" rationale, the facts for which Burling. in a memorandum to Fah..
identified as "'erroneous" and stated that the Justice Department "can support detention only it it
informs the Court, on the strength of its own reputation for veracity." that General DeWitt's claim
was factually true. But. "we know DeWitt has made false statements in his evacuation report and ve
therefore should not take the position in court" that the Final Report constituted an adequate defense
of detention. Id. at 294.
75. Despite the government's argument that evacuation v, as a military necessity. a number o1
authors have shown that it was not and that the military knew or should have kno%% tithe falsity of the
claim at the time of the evacuation. See. e.g.. F. BIDDLI, IN BRI-t AUrttORIT)t (1962). M. GRO)ZINS
AMERICANS BETRAYED (1949). By going behind General DeWitt's "linding." the Court could have
ordered that this evidence be produced. But, the Court chose not to. The recently established congres-
sional commission to investigate the internment concluded that no military necessity existed and at-
trributed the evacuation and internment primarily to political pressures. See PI RSONAi Jt-srci Di
NIED. supra note I. In 1983. bills were introduced and referred to the judiciary committees ot both
houses of Congress to provide payments to Japanese Americans displaced in World War II. See' S
1520. 98th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1983): S. 2116. 98th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1983): H. R. 3387. 98th Cong..
Ist Sess. (1983): H.R. 4110. 98th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1983).
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repetition. The Japanese-American exclusion cases should be reversed,
repudiated, and excised from our law.
THE ANCIENT WRIT OF CORAM NOBIS
Res judicata is the principal doctrine standing in the way of reopening
the Hirabayashi and Korematsu cases. In such circumstances, a writ of
coram nobis76 is an appropriate remedy by which a court can correct er-
rors in criminal convictions where other remedies are precluded. The writ
is also designed to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the ad-
ministration of justice. It is appropriate where the procedure by which
guilt was ascertained is under attack, and is reserved for extraordinary
circumstances. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) abolishes common
law writs, including the writ of coram nobis in civil cases, but the writ is
still available to reopen criminal proceedings where other relief is not
available. The petition for a writ of coram nobis is properly filed in the
federal district court in which the conviction was earlier obtained, even
though its earlier judgment has been appealed and affirmed by the Su-
preme Court.
On the basis of the evidence he uncovered in researching this book,
Peter Irons and others have prepared petitions of coram nobis in the Japa-
nese-American cases. Korematsu's case in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California came to decision on April
19, 1984. 77 At oral argument, although the government refused to con-
fess error, it "acknowledged the exceptional circumstances involved and
the injustice suffered by [Korematsu] and other Japanese Americans.'"78
The court considered the 1982 findings of the Commission on Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians that at the time of Roosevelt's
76. The source of a federal court's power to grant coram nobis relief lies in the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1948). For discussion, see United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); James v.
United States, 459 U.S. 1044 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting from a denial to grant certiorari); Chres-
field v. United States, 381 F. Supp. 301, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1974). In James, Justice Brennan stated that in
"criminal cases, the writ of coram nobis itself remains available whenever resort to a more usual
remedy would be inappropriate." 459 U.S. at 1047. He observed that "28 U.S.C. § 2255, which has
taken over most of the function of the writ of coram nobis in federal criminal procedure, only applies
to collateral attacks on underlying sentences, and could not be employed to vacate and reenter an
order denying a motion under Rule 35." 459 U.S. at 1047, n.5. By a parity of reasoning, coram
nobis is not defeated in cases like Korematsu's by the habeas corpus provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2255
because habeas corpus is not an adequate remedy where the sentence has been served and the "in
custody" requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 cannot be met. In these unusual circumstances, the
extraordinary writ of coram nobis is appropriate to correct fundamental errors and prevent injustice.
United States v. Correa De-Jesus, 708 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1983).
77. Korematsu v. United States, No. Cr-27635 W, (N.C. Cal., April 19, 1984) (memorandum
opinion, available on Lexis).
78. Id. at 26.
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executive order and General DeWitt's military orders "there was substan-
tial credible evidence from a number of federal civilian and military agen-
cies contradicting the report of General DeWitt that military necessity jus-
tified exclusion and internment of all persons of Japanese ancestry
without regard to individual identification of those who may have been
potentially disloyal.' ,79 In granting the writ of coram nobis, the court also
looked to the original record and to the new evidence uncovered by Irons,
observing:
there is substantial support in the record that the government deliberately
omitted relevant information and provided misleading information in papers
before the court. The information was critical to the court's determination,
although it cannot now be said what result would have obtained had the
information been disclosed. Because the information was of the kind pecu-
liarly within the government's knowledge, the court was dependent upon
the government to provide a full and accurate account. Failure to do so pre-
sents [a] "compelling circumstance" ..... The judicial process is seriously
impaired when the government's law enforcement officers violate their ethi-
cal obligations to the court. 80
This decision did not reach any errors of law that had been argued by
Korematsu because, the court ruled, the writ "was not used to correct
legal errors and this court has no power, nor does it attempt, to correct
any such errors." 8 1 Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in Korematsu
still stands as the law of the case. But Fred Korematsu now has his writ of
coram nobis, and he knows it can be issued "only under circumstances
compelling such action to achieve justice" and to correct "errors of the
most fundamental character.''82 Yet he and all Americans must also
know that the most fundamental error will not be corrected until the Su-
preme Court repudiates and reverses its Japanese-American decisions, re-
placing them with Mr. Justice Murphy's dissent in Korematsu:83
Racial discrimination in any form and in any degree has no justifiable part
whatever in our democratic way of life. It is unattractive in any setting but it
is utterly revolting among a free people who have embraced the principles
set forth in the Constitution of the United States. All residents of this nation
are kin in some way by blood or culture to a foreign land. Yet they are
primarily and necessarily a part of the new and distinct civilization of the
United States. They must accordingly be treated at all times as the heirs of
the American experiment and as entitled to all the rights and freedoms guar-
anteed by the Constitution.
79. Id. at 19.
80. Id. at 26-27.
81. Id. at 27.
82. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511-12 (1954).
83. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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